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In Search of the ‘X’ Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy 
 
© Dr Jonathan Fennell  
Defence Studies Department,  
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Abstract : 
A functional conceptualisation of morale is proposed, which focuses its meaning on 
motivation and the willingness to act rather than mood and group dynamics. Morale, 
it is argued, emerges from the subtle interrelationships of the many factors known to 
affect military means. It can be assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively, 
allowing the interaction between morale and policy to be explored in a manner that 
facilitates insight into the strategic process. A case study from the North African 
campaign of World War II is presented to explore in detail the relationship between 
morale and the art of war – strategy. 
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‘In Search of the ‘X’ Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’. 
 
Samuel A. Stouffer et al began their four-volume study of social psychology in the 
Second World War (1949) with a quote from Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace. 
 
In warfare the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something 
else, an unknown X. Military science, seeing in history an immense number of 
examples in which the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, and in 
which small numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognises the existence of this 
unknown factor, and tries to find it sometimes in some geometrical disposition of 
the troops, sometimes in the superiority of weapons, and most often in the genius 
of the leaders. But none of those factors yield results that agree with the historical 
facts.1 
 
The psychologist Frederick J. Manning began his own study on ‘Morale, Cohesion, 
and Esprit de Corps’ in 1991 with the exact same quote. He was quick, however, to 
point out that both Tolstoy and Stouffer might have ‘been overly harsh in their 
judgment of military science and its practitioners’;2 for throughout history, soldiers 
and military theorists have identified morale as an important factor in combat 
performance. Four hundred years before Christ, Xenophon argued that ‘in action, the 
sustaining of morale was an imperative,’3 and when ‘morale’ was ‘high action must 
be sought.’4 Napoleon had his dictum that the moral outweighs the material by three 
to one.5 Clausewitz argued that moral elements were ‘among the most important in 
war,’6 while du Picq wrote that ‘nothing can wisely be described in an army . . . 
without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Samuel A. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life, Volume 1 (London, 
1949), p. 3. 
2 Frederick J. Manning, ‘Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps’ in Reuven Gal and A. David 
Mangelsdorff (eds.), Handbook of Military Psychology (Chichester, 1991), p. 453. 
3 Godfrey Hutchinson, Xenophon and the Art of Command (London, 2000), p. 60. 
4 Ibid. p. 191. 
5 Letter from Napoleon to his brother Joseph advising him on how to rule Spain, 27 August 1808. 
Quoted in Trevor N. Dupuy, ‘Theory of Combat’, in Franklin D. Margiotta (ed.), Brassey’s 
Encyclopaedia of Military History and Biography (London, 1994), p. 967. 
6 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (London, 1993), p. 216. First published in German in 1831. 
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his morale.’7 Foch’s famous formula ‘Victory=Will’ was ‘representative of opinion 
among military professionals throughout Europe’ at the time of the First World War.8 
Liddell Hart argued, between the wars, for ‘the predominance of moral factors in all 
military decisions.’9 Referring to the Second World War, Patton claimed that 80 
percent of a commander’s role was ‘to arouse morale in his men.’10 Even today, 
General Sir Rupert Smith argues that ‘the will to win is the paramount factor in any 
battle’ and that ‘we call this will morale.’11 
 
Although the maintenance of morale has long been recognised in military circles as an 
important factor in war, ‘outside these circles’, as John Baynes has pointed out,  ‘there 
is sometimes difficulty in appreciating why this is so.’12 Morale is a nebulous and 
difficult to define concept and is not obviously amenable to quantification. General 
Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant General of the British Army during the Second World 
War, said that morale could only be ‘painted with the impressionistic brush of a 
Turner and not with the microscopic detail of a Canaletto.’13 More recently, André 
Loez has gone so far as to say that ‘le “moral” des soldats n’existe pas’.14 Without a 
clear and reliable definition of morale, or an accepted approach to assess or ‘measure’ 
morale, it is extremely difficult to make connections between military outcomes and 
morale. Scholars, as opposed to military practitioners and theorists, have, therefore, 
and perhaps quite wisely, concentrated on more quantifiable factors such as 
technology, economics, logistics and tactics to explain the outcomes of battles and 
wars.15 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Col. Ardant du Picq, ‘Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle’, in Roots of Strategy, Book Two: 
Three Military Classics (Mechanicsburg, 1987), p. 65. 
8 David Englander, ‘Mutinies and Military Morale’, in Hew Strachan (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated 
History of the First World War (Oxford, 1998), p. 191. 
9 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Decisive Wars of History: A Study in Strategy (London, 1929), p. 3. 
10 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (London, 2003), p. 138. 
11 General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London, 
2005), p. 241. 
12 John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (London, 1967), p. 92. 
13 National Archives (NA) War Office (WO) 259/44 Army Morale: Paper by Adjutant General, May 
1944. 
14 André Loez, ‘Pour en Finir avec le “Moral” des Combattants’, in Michel Houdiard (ed.), Combats: 
Hommage à Jules Maurin, Historien (2010). 
15 For some interesting studies on combat effectiveness see: Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray’s 
three volume study, Military Effectiveness; Sam C. Sarkesian (ed.), Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, 
Stress, and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980); Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining 
Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, 2004). 
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This article aims to make a contribution to the understanding of morale in military 
affairs. It argues that the concept of military morale remains ill defined, inconsistently 
used and poorly understood. The article proposes that the concept of morale has no 
place in a critical analysis of the past unless it is clearly differentiated from definitions 
associated solely or primarily with mood or cohesion and the group. Instead, for 
morale to have explanatory value, particularly in a combat environment, a functional 
conceptualisation is proposed, which, while not excluding the role of mood or group 
cohesion, focuses its meaning and relevance on motivation and the willingness to act 
in a manner required by an authority or institution. By drawing on studies made 
across the social sciences and on primary archival evidence from the British and 
Commonwealth Army’s experiences in North Africa in the Second World War, the 
article generates a multi-dimensional model of morale.  It suggests that morale can 
best be understood as emerging from the subtle interdependencies and 
interrelationships of the many factors known to affect military means. This 
perspective on morale allows the interaction between morale and policy to be 
explored in a manner that facilitates insight into the art of war (strategy). The article 
explores methodologies to ‘measure’ and assess morale and argues, through the use of 
a case study on the North African Campaign of the Second World War, that the 
theories, models, definitions and methodologies explored can be employed by policy 




Finding agreement on what the term morale actually means is a considerable 
challenge. There are, according to some, almost as many definitions of morale as 
there are people writing about it.16 In 1958, the industrial psychologist Robert Guion 
listed seven different commonly used definitions of the term:  
 
1. Morale is the absence of conflict 
2. Morale is a feeling of happiness 
3. Morale is good personal adjustment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 S.J. Motowidlo, B.E. Dowell, W.C. Borman, P.D. Johnson and M.D. Dunnette, Motivation. 
Satisfaction, and Morale in Army Careers: A Review of Theory and Measurement (Minneapolis, 1976), 
pp. 49-52. 
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4. Morale is ego involvement in one’s job 
5. Morale is the extent of ‘we-feeling’ or cohesiveness of the group 
6. Morale is a collection of job related attitudes 
7. Morale is a personal acceptance of the goals of the group.  
 
Guion concluded that none of these definitions was adequate and offered an eighth: 
‘Morale is the extent to which an individual’s needs are satisfied and the extent to 
which the individual perceives that satisfaction as stemming from his total job 
situation’.17  
 
More recently (1987), the psychologists Gal and Manning outlined another three 
commonly used definitions:  
 
1. Morale is confidence in one’s self, team, weapon or commanders 
2. Morale is perceived group cohesion 
3. Morale is a sense of contribution or commitment.18  
 
In their 1976 study of ‘Motivation, Satisfaction and Morale in Army Careers’, 
Stephan Motowidlo et al set out yet another three broad approaches to the definition 
of morale: 
 
1. Motivation (goals, determination, persistence, tenacity, progress)  
2. Satisfaction (cheerfulness, contentment, freedom from worry, satisfaction of 
physical needs for food, water, rest etc.)  
3. Group cohesiveness (solidarity, cooperation, self-sacrifice for the group, esprit de 
corps, traditions).19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Robert M. Guion, ‘Industrial Morale (A Symposium): 1. The Problem of Terminology’, Personnel 
Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1958), 60-2. 
18 Reuven Gal and Frederick J. Manning, ‘Morale and its Components: A Cross National Comparison’, 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1987), p. 369. This tripartite view of morale is, 
according to Manning, ‘Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps’ in Gal and Mangelsdorff (eds.), 
Handbook of Military Psychology, p. 455, similar to those of I.N. Evonic, ‘Motivation and Morale in 
Military Noncombat Organisations’, Proceedings of the NATO Panel VIII Symposium on Motivation 
and Morale in NATO Forces (Brussels, 1980) and K.R. Smith, ‘Understanding Morale: With Special 
Reference to the Morale of the Australian Infantryman in Vietnam’, Defence Force Journal, Vol. 52 
(May/June 1985), pp. 53-62. 
	   6	  
 
Building on the approach of Guion, Gal, Manning, Motowidlo et al and others, it is 
certainly possible to identify broad approaches to the definition of morale in the 
literature. The most common approach would appear to describe morale as primarily 
an affective state (psychological orientations that are an expression of or dependent 
on emotions or feelings). Another considers morale as an aspect of group dynamics 
and yet another associates morale more closely with motivation (see Table 1). 
However, many definitions of morale cut across neat delineations and 
conceptualisations and conflate and combine different ideas related to morale. 
Manning, for instance, describes morale as the ‘enthusiasm and persistence with 
which a member of a group engages in the prescribed activities of that group’.20 Thus, 
he conflates morale as an affective state, a motivational state, and an aspect of group 
dynamics. Thomas Britt and James Dickinson define morale as ‘a service member’s 
level of motivation and enthusiasm for accomplishing mission objectives’, thus 
combining morale as motivation and morale as an affective state.21 
 
Table 1: Broad Approaches to the Definition of Military Morale 
 Guion Gal and Manning Motowidlo et al 
Affective State Absence of conflict Confidence Satisfaction 
 Happiness Sense of commitment  
 Personal adjustment   
 Ego involvement   
 Satisfaction from job   
 Job related attitudes   
Group dynamics Cohesiveness Group cohesion Group cohesion 
 Acceptance of goals of 
the group 
  
Motivation   Motivation 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Motowidlo, Dowell, Borman, Johnson and Dunnette, Motivation. Satisfaction, and Morale in Army 
Careers, p. 49.  
20 Manning, ‘Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps’ in Gal and Mangelsdorff (eds.), Handbook of 
Military Psychology, p. 455. 
21 Thomas W. Britt and James M. Dickinson, ‘Morale during Military Operations: A Positive 
Psychology Approach’, in Thomas W. Britt, Carl Andrew Castro and Amy B Adler (eds.), Military 
Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, Volume 1: Military Performance (London, 
2006), p. 162. 
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At the risk of being overly prescriptive, there are major problems with approaches 
that include affective states or group dynamics as necessary elements in the definition 
of morale. These problems arise particularly when the relationship between levels of 
morale and military performance is considered. Almost all treatments of the subject 
point to a strong relationship between high levels of morale and positive military 
performance. However, there is much evidence to suggest that troops can experience 
positive affective states while also behaving in manners that are completely contrary 
to the best interests of the military establishment. For instance, a combatant might feel 
‘happy’, ‘satisfied’ or ‘optimistic’ due to the fact that he has run away and is now safe 
from harm, or, equally, fight with great determination whilst being personally quite 
miserable. Similarly, strong group bonds can undermine positive military 
performance. A soldier might stop to aid a wounded comrade in spite of orders to 
press the attack. A group that regards a war as pointless or incompetently directed 
might see its commanders as the real enemies, since it is these commanders and their 
orders that expose them to danger. Group desertions and mutiny can evidence small 
group cohesion, yet they are clearly actions contrary to the needs of the military 
institution.22 For instance, in Vietnam, the importance of group survival often 
outweighed the need to complete assigned tasks.23 Furthermore, it is reductive to 
suggest that morale can only exist in the context of a group. Individual morale is 
influenced by a complex range of multi-dimensional factors that go far beyond simple 
group dynamics (see figure 1). 
 
It would appear, therefore, that definitions of morale that include affective states or 
aspects of group dynamics as necessary components are unhelpful in developing a 
functional understanding of military morale. If we are to consider definitions that link 
morale more closely with motivation, it is important to stress that motivation does not 
require the individual or group to be positive (or enthusiastic, as Britt and Dickinson 
suggested) about assigned objectives. Combatants can be highly motivated to carry 
out tasks that they don’t want to engage with, that they are not hopeful, optimistic or 
confident will succeed, due to the fact that they are disciplined or even coerced into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 John A. Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary 
France (Oxford, 1996), pp. 34-5. 
23 Stephen D. Wesbrook, ‘The Potential for Military Disintegration’, in Sam C. Sarkessian (ed.), 
Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (London, 1980), p. 257. 
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action. John Keegan has pointed out that ‘when the killing starts, when men are 
confronted by the realisation that to go further forward, to expose more of their bodies 
than is exposed already, entails a likelihood of death’, positive motivational factors 
‘risk failing’.  
 
“Kill or be killed” is the logic of battle – to which military law adds the rider, 
“Risk being killed by the enemy or else risk being killed by your own provost-
marshal”. 24 
 
This coercive dynamic, Keegan claims, has been present in warfare throughout the 
ages.25 Hew Strachan has also argued that coercion is not always given enough 
recognition as a motivational tool.26 Soldiers have to accept ‘the basic philosophy 
governing human relationships within an army,’27 said S.L.A. Marshall, or take what 
Stouffer et al referred to as ‘the institutionally sanctioned consequences.’28 Brigadier 
A.B. McPherson, who, in 1950, compiled the British War Office monograph on 
discipline, remarked that ‘in the inculcation of “morale” discipline is an indispensable 
factor. Self-respect, self-control and obedience to authority, which go hand in hand in 
training in discipline, are sturdy elements also in the foundation of morale.’29 
 
There is evidence to suggest that military professionals link morale closely with 
motivation and distance it from associations with positive affective states or the 
group. For example, General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery defined morale, in a 
paper he wrote on the subject in April 1946, as ‘endurance and courage in supporting 
fatigue and danger . . . the quality which makes men go forward in an attack and hold 
their ground in defence.’30 He stated categorically that high morale ‘is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 John Keegan, ‘Towards a Theory of Combat Motivation’ in Paul Addison and Angus Calder (eds.), 
Time to Kill: The Soldier’s Experience of War in the West 1939-1945 (London, 1997), p. 6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hew Strachan, ‘The Soldier’s Experience in Two World Wars: Some Historiographical 
Comparisons’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to Kill, p.374-5. 
27 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (New York, 
1966), p. 165. 
28 Samuel A. Stouffer et al, The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath (New York, 1965), p. 
101. 
29 NA WO 277/7 A.B. McPherson, ‘The Second World War 1939-1945, Army Discipline’, p. 2. 
30 Imperial War Museum (IWM) 99/1/2 Major General Raymond Briggs Papers, Paper by Field-
Marshal Montgomery, ‘Morale in Battle: Analysis’, 30 April 1946, p. 43. 
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contentment or satisfaction’ or ‘happiness’. Happiness, according to Montgomery, 
‘may be a contributory factor in the maintenance of morale over a long period, but it 
is no more than that. A man can be unhappy but can still, regularly and without 
complaining, advance and defend’.31 He saw group dynamics in very much the same 
light.32 Morale, according to Montgomery, is clearly like an overall causative 
influence on a soldier's conduct; indeed some psychologists use the term 'motivation’ 
in similar contexts.33 
 
Montgomery’s definition gets to the heart of the concept of military morale. He 
defined morale as ‘courage’ or ‘a quality’ which makes soldiers ‘go forward’ or ‘hold 
their ground’, or to put it another way, act in an institutionally required manner.  
Morale, therefore, can be defined as the willingness of an individual or group to 
engage in an action required by an authority or institution; this willingness may be 
engendered by a positive desire for action and/or by the discipline to accept orders to 
take such action. The degree of morale of an individual or army relates to the extent 
of their willingness or discipline to act, or their determination to see an action 
through. This is the broad approach to the conceptualisation of morale that is taken in 
this paper. It clearly links morale with positive military performance and, therefore, 
makes sense of the strong emphasis that military organisations place on morale. It 
does not conflate morale with mood or group dynamics (while not excluding the 
possible benefit of positive emotions or group cohesion on military morale). Instead it 
recognises that military institutions require their personnel, first and foremost, to be 
willing to carry out orders. If troops are willing to carry out orders, any military 
organisation will have a chance of success irrespective of the mood of their men and 
women or the cohesiveness of their groups.34 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid, pp. 47-8. 
32 Ibid, pp. 51-3. 
33 Douglas A. Bernstein, Alison Clarke-Stewart, Edward J. Roy, Christopher D. Wickens, Psychology 
(Boston, 1997). p. 337. 
34 In fact, one of Britt’s other studies supports this view. He asked a small sample of soldiers to indicate 
what they thought were the key characteristics of morale. He found that soldiers were most likely to 
indicate the attributes of motivation and drive in their views of morale (Quoted in Thomas Britt and 
Dickinson, ‘Morale during Military Operations’, in Britt, Castro and Adler (eds.), Military Life, p. 
163). 
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Influences on Morale 
 
Much of the literature on morale has focused on the influences, antecedents or 
‘determinants’ of high and low morale.35 Since 1945, the dominant explanation of 
what maintains morale in modern war has undoubtedly been primary group theory.36 
Primary group theory stresses ‘that men fight not for a higher cause but for their 
“mates” and “buddies”, bound by war in a relationship which . . . can achieve great 
intensity.’37 
 
Another common explanation for combat morale and motivation is ideology or 
‘cause’. Strachan has argued that military factors alone do not suffice to explain 
combat motivation.38 This viewpoint, it has been suggested, is ‘grounded in the belief 
that the ways and ideals of the combatants, rather than purely internal military logic, 
often better explain how war is fought.’39 Marshall’s own definition of morale 
recognised this inherent complexity. 
  
Morale is the thinking of an army. It is the whole complex body of an army’s 
thought: The way it feels about the soil and about the people from which it springs. 
The way that it feels about their cause and their politics as compared with other 
causes and other politics. The way that it feels about its friends and allies, as well 
as its enemies. About its commanders and goldbricks. About food and shelter. 
Duty and leisure. Payday and sex. Militarism and civilianism. Freedom and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See for example: Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation 
of Warfare (Oxford, 1985); Lieutenant-Colonel C.D. Daly, ‘A Psychological Analysis of Military 
Morale’, The Army Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 (April 1936); John Ellis, The Sharp End: The 
Fighting Man in World War II (London, 1993); Stephen G. Fritz, Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier 
in World War II (Kentucky, 1995); Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle 
(London, 2004); Peter Karsten (ed.), Motivating Soldiers: Morale and Mutiny (London, 1998); 
Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (London, 1982); Manning, 
‘Morale, Cohesion and Esprit de Corps’ in Gal and Mangelsdorff (eds.), Handbook of Military 
Psychology; Roger R. Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in 
World War II (Lawrence, 2011); Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration 
in the Wehrmacht in World War II’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 12 (Summer 1948). 
36 Strachan, ‘The Soldier’s Experience in Two World Wars’, in Addison and Calder, (eds.), Time to 
Kill, p. 371. 
37 Hew Strachan, ‘The Morale of the German Army 1917-18’, in Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle, 
Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced (London, 1996), p. 388. 
38 Strachan, ‘The Soldier’s Experience in Two World Wars’, in Addison and Calder (eds.), Time to 
Kill, p. 375. 
39 J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (London, 2004), p. 393. 
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slavery. Work and want. Weapons and comradeship. Bunk fatigue and drill. 
Discipline and disorder. Life and death. God and the devil.40 
 
Indeed, Stouffer et al commented that ‘the motivation of combat behaviour was so 
complex that at most it c[ould] be hoped that few major factors have been entirely 
neglected.’41 This, of course, raises some significant problems. Such a view of morale 
can be seen as ‘so general, pervasive, and complex’ that it is ‘not likely to be readily 
amenable to rigorous scientific analysis’. Motawidlo et al were concerned that morale 
thus understood explained ‘too much to be heuristically useful and might be too 
internally complex to be empirically workable’.42  
 
Consequently, perhaps, some studies have focused on overly reductive explanations 
for what causes and maintains combatant morale. This has especially been the case in 
literature on primary group cohesion.43 Although cohesion, like morale, can be 
defined in many ways, it is generally agreed that the essence of cohesion ‘is trust 
among group members (e.g., to watch each other’s back) together with the capacity 
for teamwork (e.g., pulling together to get the task or job done).’44 The published 
literature on cohesion has added greatly to our understanding of group dynamics in 
combat. At its best, it has explored the intricate web of interrelationships between the 
group and the other factors that influence morale and combat performance. However, 
at its worst it has conflated a complex and multidimensional issue into an 
oversimplified construct that seeks to function as a catch all explanation for battle 
morale and combat effectiveness. There is, in fact, as Marshal and Stouffer et al have 
pointed out, an amalgam of influences driving morale, only one of which is group 
cohesion. 
A comprehensive analysis of the many factors identified in the literature as influences 
on morale can make for a more nuanced understanding of the topic. These factors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 158. 
41 Stouffer, Combat and Its Aftermath, p. 106. 
42 Motowidlo, Dowell, Borman, Johnson and Dunnette, Motivation. Satisfaction, and Morale in Army 
Careers, p. 49. 
43 See for example Janowitz and Shils, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War 
II’ and the special issue on combat cohesion in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2006), and 
the continuing debate that follows.  
44 Guy L. Siebold, ‘The Essence of Military Group Cohesion’, Armed Forced and Society, Vol. 33, No. 
2 (2007), p. 288 
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may be broadly categorized as endogenous (factors primarily within the military 
organisation) or exogenous (factors primarily outside of the military organisation). 
The most obvious of the endogenous factors that influence morale, and the ones that 
military historians, psychologists and anthropologists pay most attention to, are 
institutional factors. These are factors clearly under the control of a military 
organisation and may include, but are not restricted to, dynamics such as command, 
discipline, selection of personnel, doctrine, welfare and education, ethos and duty, 
training, efficient organisation and supply (see Figure 1). Social factors such as 
leadership, cohesion (primary group) and esprit (secondary group) are also important. 
Individual factors such as a person’s disposition, background, coping strategies, 
relationship with home, experience and levels of fear, confidence, fatigue and rest 
cannot be discounted either. 
 
Figure 1: Factors affecting the morale of troops, commanders and the army. 
 
 
Exogenous factors, issues external to the military organisation, can also play a 
fundamentally important role in inculcating morale. This approach has been 
characterised as the ‘cultural’ study of war by some authors.45 ‘Above and beyond any 
symbol,’ in Marshall’s view, ‘whether it be the individual life or a pillbox 
commanding a wadi in [the] Sahara – are all of the ideas and ideals which press upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 J.E. Lendon, Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (London, 2004), p. 393. 
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men, causing them to accept a discipline and to hold to the line even though death 
may be at hand.’46 These factors can be broadly categorized as political (comprising 
propaganda, stated war aims, ideology and the size of force mobilised), economic 
(comprising the amount and quality of weapons technology and equipment available), 
cultural (comprising basic military law/rules of engagement, values/ethics and view of 
the enemy), environmental (comprising the type of terrain fought over and climate) 
and situational (comprising the amount and quality of information available, rumours, 
friction and situational antecedents such as recent successes or failures in battle). 
 
The approach taken here does not attempt to list exhaustively the factors that can 
influence morale. Instead, it focuses on identifying and categorising some of the main 
antecedents of good and bad morale. It benefits from simplicity, as it does not engage 
with the manner in which the individual or group interrelates with these dynamics. It 
does not create a hierarchy of influences or insert intervening variables between the 
‘independent’ and the ‘dependent’ ones (morale).47 It simply outlines the broad 
categories of factors that must be studied when trying to understand the morale of an 
individual, group or army. Although these factors will interrelate in a different 
manner in each war, the nature of morale and the factors that influence it are broadly 
unchanging. It is clear, therefore, that historians and social scientists have to look far 
beyond catch-all or reductive explanations for military morale, if they are to fully 
understand the complex array of issues that influence a soldier’s willingness to fight.48 
 
Morale and Strategy 
 
Few studies have seriously addressed the connection between the individual’s combat 
motivation, the morale of a unit or formation, and the art of devising successful 
strategy. As John A. Lynn has argued, too many histories are founded upon vague 
assumptions concerning military performance and outcomes in war. Historians, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Marshall, Men Against Fire, pp. 161-2. 
47 See for example Britt and Dickinson, ‘Morale during Military Operations’, in Britt, Castro and Adler 
(eds.), Military Life, p. 160. 
48 See for instance, Jonathan Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth 
Army and the Path to El Alamein (Cambridge, 2011), chapter 8. 
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perhaps overly focused on building narratives, rarely bother to elaborate the 
underpinning of their analysis.49 
 
According to Clausewitz, ‘war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our 
will’.50 This statement suggests that, more often than not, belligerents fight for a goal, 
or an end, that they try to achieve or impose upon an enemy. That goal does not have 
to be rational or particularly well thought out; it can be driven by reason, passion and 
hatred or pure chance. Nevertheless, the challenge of devising a successful strategy to 
achieve a goal dominates military theory and practice. Indeed strategy was the central 
and unifying theme of Clausewitz’s On War.51  
 
Clausewitz defined strategy as the ‘use of the engagement for the purpose of the 
war’.52 More recently, Colin Gray defined strategy as ‘the use that is made of force 
and the threat of force for the ends of policy’,53 while Liddell Hart described strategy 
as ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy’.54 
Thus, it appears clear that the relationship between military means and policy 
objectives (or ends) is at the heart of the strategic process.55 Military decision makers 
have constantly to align their means to coincide with policy; vice versa, policy makers 
have to create policy in line with the available means. As Strachan puts it 
 
In the ideal model of civil–military relations, the democratic head of state sets out 
his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. 
The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue 
where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a 
compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to 
implement it.56 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Lynn, The Bayonets of the Republic, p. 21. 
50 Clausewitz, On War, p. 83. 
51 Hew Strachan, ‘A Clausewitz for Every Season’, American Interest, July/August 2007, p. 33. 
52 Clausewitz, On War, p. 207. 
53 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1999), p. 17. 
54 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, 1967), p. 335. 
55 Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War’, Survival, 
Vol. 52, No. 5 (2010), p. 158. 
56 Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, Survival, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Autumn, 2005), p. 52.  
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To achieve policy by use of violent means, a belligerent has typically to match his 
effort against what Clausewitz referred to as an enemy’s ‘power of resistance’. This 
he expressed as ‘the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his 
disposal and the strength of his will.’ 
 
The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter – though not exclusively – of 
figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to 
determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive 
animating it.57 
 
To put it another way, an enemy must also engage with strategy and balance ends 
with means. Military means are a product of the interplay between the material 
capability to fight and the will to fight (morale, as defined above).58 When an enemy 
can no longer continue to fight, because their material strength has been whittled 
away through attrition, or is no longer willing to fight, and deserts or surrenders en 
masse, that enemy must eventually, by engaging in the strategic process, also alter 
policy (ends must reflect means). Victory ensues when a belligerent comes to the 
conclusion that he or she no longer has the means, either physical or psychological, or 
both, to resist the will of the enemy and alters policy (to for example surrender or 
enter negotiations for a cease fire). 
 
As Michael Howard has put it 
 
The military means used to obtain the purposes of the war were divided by 
Clausewitz and his successors into two: Vernightungsstrategie, ‘strategy of 
annihilation’ – the destruction of the enemy capacity to defend himself by 
destroying his armed forces on the battlefield; and Ermattungsstrategie, the use of 
attrition to wear down his will to resist. The first disarms the adversary, leaving him 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Clausewitz, On War, p. 86. 
58 ‘Material capability’ encompases what current British Defence Doctrine (Fourth Edition, November 
2011) refers to as the ‘physical’ and ‘conceptual’ components of fighting power. ‘Will to fight’ equates 
to the ‘moral’ component of fighting power as set out in British Defence Doctrine. 
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literally at the mercy of the victor. The second persuades him that victory is, if not 
impossible, only obtainable at an unacceptable price.59 
 
Thus, the relationship between morale, military means, strategy and policy can be 
diagrammatically set forth as follows: 
 





It must be noted, however, that military outcomes rarely require the complete and 
utter destruction of the material means at the disposal of an enemy force. As Gray has 
argued, ‘strategic history demonstrates the prevalence’ of the loss of the ‘enemy’s 
will’ in deciding military outcomes.60 History suggests that conflicts are decided more 
often than not because one side loses the will to fight and, therefore, changes policy.61  
 
This relationship appears to hold true across the full spectrum of military conflicts and 
across all ‘levels of war’. For instance, Mao Tse-tung argued that in irregular war ‘the 
contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a 
contest of human power and morale’.62 Irregular wars, as clearly set out in a number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Michael Howard, ‘When are Wars Decisive?’, Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999), p. 128. 
60 Gray, Modern Strategy, pp. 18-19;  
61 For other studies that have made use of Clausewitz’s perspective of the relationship between ‘means’ 
and ‘will’, see Mark Clodfelter, ‘Aiming to Break Will: America’s World War II Bombing of German 
Morale and its Ramifications’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2010); Niall Ferguson, 
‘Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political Economy of 
Military Defeat’, War in History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004); Michael Howard, ‘When are Wars Decisive?’, 
Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1999). 
62 Mao-Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1963), pp. 217-18. 
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of recent articles, are in nature exactly the same as conventional ones.63 The morale of 
combatants remains equally important in an insurgency; it is just the manner in which 
belligerents can influence the antecedents of morale that may differ. In a conventional 
war, belligerents can affect morale by attacking many of the endogenous influences 
on morale, for instance through the destruction of the enemy’s forces or through 
superior tactical deployments and equipment. In an insurgency, ‘war amongst the 
people’, this process can prove much more difficult. Insurgents do not mass in a 
definable battle space; they do not wear easily identifiable uniforms and they blend 
into the civilian population. However, in an irregular war, belligerents can also 
influence morale by access to other antecedents of the will to fight. These can include 
exogenous factors such as developing the local economy, delivering accessible and 
quality education and fostering more accountable and efficient government.64 
 
Western governments and militaries, learning from their experiences in Afghanistan 
and Iraq and elsewhere, have increasingly recognised that insurgents too must 
strategise and align ends with means.65 It is extremely difficult, however, as the 
Americans discovered in Vietnam, to destroy the material capability of an insurgency. 
Instead, western militaries have championed ‘hearts and minds’ approaches that aim 
to influence and alter the people’s, and therefore the insurgents’, will to fight. Again, 
by influencing the means at the disposal of the enemy, by targeting enemy morale, 
western forces attempt to influence strategy and ultimately policy. Vice versa, as 
Antulio Echevarria puts it, ‘[t]hroughout history, terrorists, guerillas, and similar 
actors have typically aimed at an opponent’s will to fight rather that his means 
[military capability]; the difference now is that they enjoy enhanced access to that 
will.’66 Thus, the centrality of morale in counter-insurgency environments has become 
increasingly evident. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See for example, Colin M. Fleming, ‘New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future’, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2009); Bart Shuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the “New Wars” 
Scholars’, Parameters, Spring 2010. 
64 See John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago, 2005). 
65 See Fleming, ‘New or Old Wars?’, Journal of Strategic Studies; Shuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the 
“New Wars” Scholars’, Parameters. 
66 Quoted in Shuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars’, Parameters, p. 92. 
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The primacy of morale in strategy appears to hold true even in the sphere of nuclear 
conflict. Gray has pointed out that 
 
My intercontinental ballistic missiles may be feeling well, and indeed might be 
very content to be ordered to exercise their function in action. But, are the humans 
in the chain of command willing to dispatch them? . . . The brutal arithmetic of 
combat is important, but it does not tell the whole story. Many factors contribute 
positively or negatively to fighting power, but there should be no evasion of 
recognition of the central importance of the willingness of people to fight.67 
 
It is certainly arguable that the basis of Cold War strategy, the doctrines of deterrence 
and mutually assured destruction, were built on this crucial understanding. The USA 
and the Soviet Union maintained heretofore unimaginable military capability in the 
form of nuclear weapons. However, neither could destroy in a first strike the total 
material (nuclear) means at the disposal of the enemy. Instead, by guaranteeing a 
second strike capability, both sides targeted the willingness of the enemy to fight and 
employ their nuclear arsenals. In an environment where technology appeared 
paramount, it was, in fact, considerations related to morale that significantly 
influenced strategy, and, therefore, policy. 
 
Assessment of Morale 
 
It would appear, therefore, that morale plays a crucial role in the strategic process. 
However, a concise conceptualisation of morale, and a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between morale, military means, strategy and ends, means little if policy 
makers, military practitioners and scholars cannot realistically assess or ‘measure’ 
morale and, therefore, make meaningful use of it in devising strategy. As Michael 
Handell has put it, ‘the assessment of the enemy’s will is fraught with problems today 
as it was in Clausewitz’s time. The danger is that modern intelligence analysts and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Colin S. Gray, 'Moral Advantage, Strategic Advantage?', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2010). 
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commanders may focus on that which can be measured rather than on the critical but 
more elusive factor of will.’68 
 
The standard method of assessing morale is to rely on individuals’ reported levels of 
morale. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, Marshall and Stouffer et al made 
extensive use of attitudinal surveys in their works on the German and American 
armies in the Second World War.69 More recently, Leonard Wong et al employed 
similar surveys in their report on combat motivation in the 2003 Iraq War.70 Such 
studies, although rare, are invaluable sources on the state of morale in a military 
organisation.  
 
Historians, who often have to make use of far less suitable sources, are particularly 
reliant on personal accounts, letters and diaries when attempting to assess morale in a 
unit or army. Recent studies, such as Alexander Watson’s Enduring the Great War 
and this author’s Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign have tried to 
circumvent this problem by making use of official sources, such as morale reports and 
censorship summaries. These types of sources cover morale more widely and deeply 
and tend to express views that represent a considerable body of opinion among troops, 
not isolated instances of over-exuberance or ill-temper. 
 
Military professionals, theorists and scholars, however, assess morale not only 
through soldiers’ stated willingness to engage with an enemy, or through their actual 
fighting behaviour, but by means of a complex web of other factors.71 Some of these 
factors are primarily outcomes or correlates of morale; rates of desertion, sickness, 
surrender and psychological breakdown among troops fall into this category. Others 
are influencers or determinants of morale; the whole range of endogenous and 
exogenous influence on morale, outlined in Figure 1, would fall into this category. 
Each of these factors can be explored, using available primary and secondary sources, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London, 2002), p. 15. 
69 Shils and Janowitz, ‘Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II’; Marshall, Men 
Against Fire; Stouffer et al, Combat and Its Aftermath. 
70 Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, Terrence A. Potter, ‘Why They Fight: 
Combat Motivation in the Iraq War’, Report for the Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003. 
71 NA WO 193/453 Assessment of Morale by Statistical Methods (Report by I.S.2), N.D. but probably 
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thus generating a multi-dimensional contextualisation of morale that not only 
recognises and gives expression to morale’s complexity but also takes account of the 
many factors that sustain or undermine morale or are correlates of good or bad 
morale.  
 
Some factors (such as desertion, surrender, sickness and breakdown rates) are 
amenable to quantitative analysis and comparisons. Other well-established qualitative 
procedures for assessing troop morale, such as the examination and interpretation of 
recorded perceptions of the troops themselves, their leaders, and their politicians can 
also be examined. This overall integration of quantitative and qualitative analyses of 
the many factors that are associated with morale allows for the development of a more 
detailed picture. This can be compared with known battlefield performance, allowing 
the development of a clear and supportable narrative plotting the relationship between 
morale, strategy and military outcomes.   
 
Morale and Strategy: A Case Study 
 
It may prove useful to explore how these ideas can be practically employed by 
scholars and policy makers alike. Theory is developed so that practitioners need not 
start afresh each time a new challenge arises. Clausewitz wrote that  
 
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark 
the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of 
principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of 
phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms 
of action. 72 
 
The definitions, theory and methodology set out here are an attempt to see through the 
complex web of interconnected factors that link morale and strategy in war. Indeed, 
theory must match practice and history furnishes the student with limitless examples 
of the centrality of morale in the strategic process. The case of Eighth Army in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Clausewitz, On War, p. 698 
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North African campaign of the Second World War might prove particularly 
instructive. 
 
The defeats suffered by Eighth Army at Gazala and Tobruk, in May and June 1942, 
and the stalemate on the El Alamein line, in July 1942, were, it can be argued, 
influenced significantly by a morale crisis that reached a peak in the first two weeks 
of August 1942. This crisis was not solely manifested in a lack of enthusiasm in 
Eighth Army or a failure in groups dynamics, but rather by a more general lack of 
willingness to act in the manner expected by the Army. Endogenous and exogenous 
influences on morale were significantly deficient; Eighth Army, at the time, was 
averagely led, inadequately trained, poorly equipped, uncertain of the cause it was 
fighting for and deprived of the effective support of families back home and 
sustainable primary groups.73 Deficiencies in for example leadership, training and 
equipment had an extremely negative impact on the material means available to 
Eighth Army, but they also impacted seriously on morale. Qualitative assessments of 
morale, such as those contained in censorship summaries for the period, pointed to a 
lack of willingness to engage the enemy; the summary for 5 to 11 August 1942, stated 
categorically that the troops’ mail showed ‘little or no traces of the offensive spirit, 
and an almost complete absence of any reference to forcing the enemy to give up the 
ground gained in the last two months.’74 Eighth Army also exhibited a number of 
measurable outcomes or outputs of poor morale that strongly suggest that morale was 
indeed at an all time low. For example, Eighth Army suffered a 73 per cent increase 
in sickness between March and August 1942.75 In July, battle exhaustion cases caused 
between 7 to 10 per cent of the total sick and battle casualties.76 More specifically, 
they caused around 26 per cent of South African battle casualties.77 They caused 28 
per cent of New Zealand battle casualties in August.78 The number of desertions in 
Eighth Army increased at least tenfold from the February to June period to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 See Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, Chapter 8. 
74 Archives New Zealand (ANZ) WAII/1/DA/508/1 Vol. 1 Middle East Military Censorship Weekly 
Summary (MEMCWS), No. XXXIX (5 to 11 August 1942), p. 1. 
75 NA WO 177/324 Monthly Report on Health Eighth Army, March, July, August 1942. 
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June/July period79; the situation being so serious that, in July 1942, the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir Claude Auchinleck, with the unanimous agreement of his army 
commanders, sought the reintroduction of the death penalty for desertion and 
cowardice in the field. Auchinleck presented figures to the War Office to support his 
request showing that around 88 per cent of casualties during the summer fighting 
could be classified as missing or having surrendered.80  
 
The morale crisis that broke out in Eighth Army in the summer of 1942 significantly 
influenced strategy in North Africa. Commanders, cognisant that their men were 
demonstrating behaviours associated with poor morale, had to engage in the strategic 
process and change goals. Initially this meant a retreat to the El Alamein line after the 
failures at Gazala and Tobruk, later it led to the cancellation of offensive operations 
on the El Alamein line in July 1942.81 Indeed, Auchinleck admitted, in a letter to 
General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on 25 July 1942, 
that perhaps he had ‘asked too much of [the troops].’82 Goals and means had clearly 
become unbalanced.  
 
These events encouraged Churchill to replace the Commander-in-Chief Middle East 
Forces, Auchinleck, with General Sir Harold Alexander and Montgomery was 
appointed Commander of Eighth Army. These new arrivals understood that in order 
to create an effective strategy for success in North Africa, they had to focus not only 
on improving and making better use of the means available (both material and 
morale), but also on reigning in objectives and setting more achievable goals for 
Eighth Army. A determined and purposeful effort was made by those in charge of 
strategy to improve the endogenous and exogenous factors influencing morale in the 
desert: Montgomery built his command style around the need to foster the will to 
fight in his men; levels of training and equipment were recognised to be deficient and 
were improved upon; efforts to link the soldier more effectively with his homeland, 
family and the causes that he was fighting for were implemented; policies of mixing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Courage, Cowardice and Combat Performance: Eighth Army and the Crisis in 
North Africa, 1942’, War in History, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2013). 
80 NA WO 163/89 Executive Committee of the Army Council (ECAC), The Death Penalty for 
Offences Committed on Active Service, 21 July 1942. 
81 Fennell, Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign, Chapter 7. 
82 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Alanbrooke Papers, Auchinleck to Brooke, 25 July 1942. 
	   23	  
and matching units were abandoned to facilitate the coherence of primary groups and 
esprit do corps.83 
 
At the same time, Montgomery devised plans to take account of the real state of the 
means available. He set limited objectives at the battle of Alam Halfa in September 
1942; he focused on achieving the possible with the means available rather than what 
might have been ideally desired.  Thus, at Alam Halfa, Montgomery fought an 
entirely defensive battle and eschewed the opportunity of launching an all out 
offensive against the Panzerarmee Afrika. He realised that Eighth Army, starved of 
success, required a victory, no matter how limited, to regain its morale. Thus he 
reigned in goals to take account of the morale of his men.  
 
Not least as a consequence of this strategy, Eighth Army experienced a dramatic turn 
around in fortunes in September, October and November 1942. This turnaround, it 
can be argued, was driven in no small measure by the determined and purposeful 
efforts by those in charge of strategy to take account of and improve the morale of the 
troops. The endogenous and exogenous factors influencing morale were addressed 
and improved upon. These initiatives were not built on a reductive or simplistic 
understanding of morale, but, rather, on a nuanced appreciation of the almost infinite 
complexity of human needs and motivations. Better training and equipment were 
accompanied by welfare and educational initiatives. The troops were informed of 
their part in the operations to come and their leaders made themselves known and 
familiar to Eighth Army. Qualitative assessments of morale, such as the censorship 
summary for 21 October to 3 November 1942, reported that ‘morale displayed in 
correspondence from forward . . . troops’ had ‘never reached a higher level.’84 
Assessments of measureable indicators or outputs of morale also pointed to an 
improvement. The incidence of battle exhaustion during the thirteen days of fighting 
at El Alamein was remarkably low, especially for an attritional infantry battle.85 The 
monthly statistical reports on the health of Eighth Army for October and November 	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1942 stated that the incidence of exhaustion was much smaller during the offensive 
than it had been in previous battles, the total number of cases for the two months 
combined being 209. The number for the July battles alone had been 557.86 The 2nd 
New Zealand Division suffered only 57 instances of battle exhaustion at El Alamein. 
This represented a ratio of 1 to 100 battle casualties, the lowest New Zealand ratio of 
the war.87 The South Africans suffered a rate of 2 exhaustion cases per hundred battle 
casualties. The rate during the summer battles had been 26 cases per hundred battle 
casualties.88 The daily sick admission rate was also remarkably low. By November, 
the monthly rate was 47.7 per thousand, a 33 per cent drop from a monthly rate of 75 
per thousand in August. The incidence of surrender and desertion also dramatically 
decreased. At El Alamein, those who were missing or captured made up only 17 per 
cent of casualties.  
 
This morale turnaround, it can certainly be argued, significantly influenced British 
and Commonwealth goals at the Battle of El Alamein. The German and Italian 
Panzerarmee, by any standard, put up a determined defence. In the words of Niall 
Barr, by the end of the battle ‘Eighth Army had virtually run out of formed infantry 
units that could still be used in the attack.’89 Many of the front line battalions of 
Eighth Army suffered over 50 per cent casualties.90 Nevertheless, Montgomery 
continued to pursue an offensive policy focused on the gradual attrition of the forces 
facing him. He believed that battles were ‘won primarily in the hearts of men’91 and 
was able to pursue the objectives he did because he trusted that his men were willing 
and determined to fight.  
 
Factors relating to morale also significantly influenced German strategy. There is no 
dispute over the fact that Eighth Army significantly outnumbered the Panzerarmee in 
terms of material means during the critical months of fighting that led to victory at El 
Alamein in November 1942. The Panzerarmee’s quantitative inferiority was 	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exacerbated by the fact that its supply system was compromised by distance, and, 
perhaps more importantly, by Ultra. The logistical problems facing the Panzerarmee, 
as Martin Kitchen has described, were almost insurmountable. Between January and 
August 1942 the Panzerarmee had to make do with only 40 per cent of the supplies it 
needed.92 Such circumstances have prompted Kitchen, echoing Walter Warlimont,93 to 
describe El Alamein as a battle of ‘materiel, in which tactical skill, courage and 
morale were no longer significant. It was a war that the Axis could not possibly 
win.’94 
 
However, the suggestion that German defeat at El Alamein was determined by Eighth 
Army’s materiel superiority can certainly be challenged. Eighth Army had enjoyed 
considerable numerical and materiel advantages before, at Gazala and during the July 
battles, and had been beaten. Recent scholarship has also provided evidence to 
suggest that there is a weak correlation between materiel advantages and success in 
war.95 The best equipped military machine will have little success if an army is 
unwilling to fight. The evidence from El Alamein, without a doubt, suggests that 
materiel was important, but, not solely in the manner that Warlimont and Kitchen 
imply.  
 
The ‘Lessons from Operations’ derived from the battle of El Alamein reported that 
‘considering the density of the artillery support during the various attacks, the number 
of enemy dead and wounded found by the leading troops was surprisingly light, and 
that enemy automatic weapons quickly opened up when the barrage or concentration . 
. . passed.’ The report stressed that the killing power of artillery barrages or 
concentrations against well dug in infantry is often slight. The purpose of the artillery 
support in an attack is primarily to shake the enemy’s morale, temporarily to stupefy 
him . . . to enable the attacker to reach the objective with the minimum of casualties. 
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The killing or capture of the enemy then follows.’96 Reports and accounts written later 
and after the war tended to lend support to this conclusion.97 One such report found 
that the morale effects of bombardments were anywhere between two to six times 
greater than the material effects.98  
 
By the closing stages of El Alamein the German war diaries reported that their troops 
were ‘exhausted’ and that, taking all things into consideration, ‘it had to be admitted 
that after a desperate 10-day struggle against an enemy superior on land and in the air 
the Army was in no condition to prevent a further attempt at breaking through.’99 
Ends would have to be altered to take account of the material and morale means 
available. The war diaries identified four reasons why further resistance would fail 
and plans had to be altered. The first was ‘the enemy’s great superiority in tanks and 
artillery.’ However Eighth Army’s armoured units had proved largely ineffective at El 
Alamein and it is arguable that the artillery did more morale than material damage to 
the Axis forces.100 The second reason was ‘the continual heavy day and night 
bombing attacks, against which there was no defence’ and which ‘only added to the 
feeling of inferiority’ suffered by the troops of the Panzerarmee. However, air 
bombardment was notoriously inaccurate101 and was seen by both sides largely as a 
morale weapon rather than a material one.102 The third reason was the ‘almost 
complete failure of the Italian troops.’ According to the report of the General Officer 
Commanding Afrika Korps, the Axis problem lay once again with the morale of the 
Italian formations. The fourth and final reason was the Panzerarmee’s ‘own heavy 
losses in men and materiel on account of the enemy’s vast superiority in the most 
modern weapons.’ There can be no doubt that the weight of fire unleashed on the 
Panzerarmee caused destruction and casualties. However, this arguably was not the 	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primary drain on the Panzerarmee’s material and manpower resources. In fact, a large 
proportion of these casualties can be attributed to morale rather than material causes. 
The statistics show that 40 per cent of German and 63 per cent of Italian casualties 
were missing or POW; the rate for British and Commonwealth troops during the 
battle was 17 per cent.103 In addition, extremely high sickness rates, a sure sign of 
morale problems, removed large numbers of men from the front line.104 Mark 
Harrison has estimated that nearly one in five Germans were listed as sick during the 
battle, with the elite 15th Panzer Division suffering a sickness rate as high as 38 per 
cent.105 Problems with desertion and surrender had prompted Rommel to encourage 
use of the death penalty at courts marshal during July,106 these problems persisted into 
October and November.107 Finally, one of the greatest effects of heavy losses of any 
kind is the impact that they have on group dynamics, which is generally recognised as 
a key factor in maintaining morale on the front line.108 
 
In the end, Rommel, when faced with material shortcomings and the reality that his 
German and Italian troops were increasingly de-motivated and unwilling to repel the 
British and Commonwealth advance, was forced to alter aims (and retreat) to take 
account of the means available. Morale had played a key role in the strategic process 
for both sides at the Battle of El Alamein. Eighth Army had won a brutal ‘killing 
match’ due to sheer determination and will power as much as any other factor. The 
strategists in the War Office, Middle East Command and Eighth Army had 
successfully balanced ends and means in a way that their German opponents had 
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Conclusion 
 
To conclude, morale, understood as willingness to act in a manner required by an 
authority or institution rather than solely or primarily an affective state or aspect of 
group dynamics, can play a fundamentally important role in strategy, as it did in 
North Africa. It is important, however, to stress that the goal pursued here has not 
been to suggest that morale, as Montgomery put it, is ‘the big thing in war’.110 Rather, 
the intention has been to explore the meaning of morale, the endogenous and 
exogenous influences on morale, its ‘measurement’ and the interrelationships between 
morale and the other numerous factors that influence strategy. It is clear from this 
brief study of military history and theory that material and non-material factors 
interrelate to affect the military means available to belligerents. Military means affect 
the goals and objectives set by each side in war in a process called strategy (ends must 
reflect means).  
 
The evidence presented here suggests that a belligerent’s military means cannot be 
fully understood without considering morale. This would appear to hold true in all 
wars, conventional, irregular or nuclear. Consequently, it would appear that morale 
plays an important part in the strategic process. War, as Clausewitz makes clear, is 
slaughter, but rarely does one side have to kill everyone to subdue an enemy. 
Crucially, therefore, it is entirely consistent to suggest that the British and 
Commonwealth strategy at El Alamein, in October/November 1942, was significantly 
influenced by a resurgence in morale, while also recognising the enormous impact 
that leadership and technology had on the strategic process, and, thus, the outcome of 
that battle. Better weapons and more effective leadership are also absolutely central to 
encouraging soldiers to close with and kill the enemy. The goal must not be to find 
one over-riding explanation or another, but to fully understand the interrelationships 
between multiple explanations for victory and defeat. It is the contention of this paper 
that morale must play a significant role in the multifaceted considerations that 
comprise the strategic process. If morale can indeed be comprehensively understood 
and accurately assessed, or ‘measured’, as suggested here, then historians, military 
practitioners and policy makers should consider placing morale more at the centre of 	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their considerations. To that end, it is hoped that the definitions, theories, 
methodologies and evidence set out will help eliminate the ‘unknown’ element from 
that ‘X’ factor, which is so widely recognised as an important component of strategy 
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